Al Mamun Harun Ur Rashid :
Fourteen months after the political upheaval that ended Sheikh Hasina’s 15-year rule, Bangladesh stands at a critical crossroads under an interim government led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, navigating complex regional and global challenges in trade, investment, climate cooperation and security.
The interim government has inherited a fractured political order, a vulnerable economy, and a foreign policy landscape in urgent need of repair.
In this turbulent transition, diplomacy has become not just a tool of external engagement but a strategic instrument for national recovery and economic survival.
Resetting Foreign Policy after a Decade of Imbalance
Under Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus, Dhaka has embraced “360-degree diplomacy,” moving away from the previous India-centric alignment.
His visits to the United States in September 2024 and China in March 2025 marked Bangladesh’s shift toward diversified, globally engaged partnerships rather than be bound by dependency.
During the Hasina era, Dhaka granted India transit and port access through Chattogram and Mongla without resolving long-standing issues such as Teesta water sharing or the continued border killings of Bangladeshi civilians.
The Yunus administration has made it clear that Bangladesh will no longer function as a junior partner in South Asia. Instead, it will pursue strategic autonomy rooted in mutual respect, equality, and national interest.
Trade Diplomacy and Economic Stability
The interim government has prioritised economic diplomacy to stabilise the economy. In August 2025, Bangladesh negotiated a critical reduction in tariff rates on its garment exports to the United States.
The White House imposed tariffs on Bangladesh to 37 percent but Yunus government’s adroit negotiation has cut down to 20 percent, offering crucial relief to Bangladesh’s export-dependent economy and restoring investor confidence.
In parallel, Washington signalled interest in expanding bilateral cooperation, with plans underway to explore new avenues for economic support and digital governance partnerships.
Foreign direct investment has also gained momentum. In the first half of 2025, official data shows that the United States invested approximately $1.09 billion in sectors such as power, technology, and renewable energy.
China also continued its economic engagement, with at least 14 Chinese companies investing more than $230 million in infrastructure projects since late 2024.
Japan has remained a strong development partner, funding major connectivity projects, while Middle Eastern nations have expanded energy and construction investments.
China, India, and the Geopolitical Balancing Act
Beijing is still the country’s largest trading partner and a key financier of strategic infrastructure, including the Padma Bridge rail link, Chattogram deep-sea port, and the Dhaka-Chattogram Railway modernisation project.
However, unlike the previous administration, the Yunus government emphasises that Chinese engagement must remain within the framework of the country’s sovereign interests and cannot evolve into a geopolitical dependency.
Relations with India, however, have grown tense. New Delhi so far denied medical visas to Bangladeshi patients, a move that sparked backlash and prompted Dhaka to explore alternative medical partnerships with China and Thailand. Border disputes, energy negotiations, and trade barriers continue to test bilateral trust.
The interim administration has stated publicly that Bangladesh seeks constructive ties with India but will firmly resist policies that undermine sovereignty.
Islamabad has quietly re-emerged as a pragmatic economic partner. Since late 2024, Dhaka and Islamabad have worked to normalise relations by removing additional visa requirements, easing customs restrictions, and restoring maritime cargo services between Chattogram and Karachi.
Direct cargo shipments resumed in November 2024, strengthening regional supply chain connectivity. Diplomatic visits, including a planned high-level engagement involving Pakistan’s foreign minister, reflect a new geopolitical realism in Dhaka’s foreign policy.
Soft Power and Global Image Repair
The interim government has also used soft power strategically to rebuild Bangladesh’s image abroad after allegations of human rights violations and democratic suppression under the previous regime.
In August 2025, thousands in Dhaka marked the first anniversary of the uprising that ousted Sheikh Hasina, hailed by international media as the country’s “second liberation,” boosting Bangladesh’s democratic credibility abroad.
Chief Adviser Muhammad Yunus’s own international reputation has also boosted diplomatic access. His global stature has facilitated negotiations with Western governments and international organisations.
Under his leadership, Bangladesh secured pardons for Bangladeshi workers jailed in the UAE and expanded diaspora services, including home delivery of e-passports and better staffing in foreign missions to improve service delivery.
Embassies and consulates including Malaysia are part of a wider push to expand overseas labour markets, a move vital to sustaining the country’s remittance economy.
Security, Migration, and the Rohingya Challenge
Regional security remains a major challenge.
The Rohingya refugee crisis continues to strain resources and diplomatic relations with Myanmar. Drug trafficking through Cox’s Bazar, cross-border militancy, and maritime security in the Bay of Bengal require coordinated diplomacy with regional actors.
Dhaka has intensified border security cooperation with Nepal, Thailand, and Myanmar while seeking UN-led pressure to expedite Rohingya repatriation.
To address Rohingya crisis, at the UN General Assembly’s High-Level Conference on the Rohingya, Muhammad Yunus presented a seven-point plan outlining a comprehensive and concrete strategy for addressing the plight of Rohingya Muslims and other minorities in Myanmar.
Climate Diplomacy and Global Presence
Bangladesh remains one of the most climate-vulnerable nations in the world. Climate diplomacy has therefore become a national priority. At recent global climate summits, Dhaka has demanded climate justice, loss-and-damage funds, and debt relief for vulnerable economies. The government now positions Bangladesh not as a passive victim of climate change but as a leader in adaptation and resilience planning.
The interim administration has shifted foreign policy from dependency politics to a sovereign, Bangladesh-first strategy focused on diversification and balance.
Challenges remain, but the country now has a chance to assert itself as a confident regional actor rather than a client state.
If this diplomatic realignment continues with strategic clarity and economic discipline, Bangladesh could emerge stronger – not by choosing sides in global power rivalries, but by asserting its right to chart its own path in the world.
