Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, which assumed office amid high public expectations, is approaching the end of its tenure as the country moves closer to elections, that mark “the final step in the delicate political transition that has been under way for a year and a half,” according to the International Crisis Group (ICG), the Brussels-based think tank.
“Bangladeshis had high expectations of the interim government, which remained popular for some time, though it has lost some of its lustre of late,” said Crisis Group’s expert on Bangladesh, Senior Consultant Thomas Kean, in a Q&A published Monday on the ICG’s website.
Chief of interim government Prof Muhammad Yunus and his cohort have chalked up major achievements, including stabilising an economy that had been teetering under Hasina and maintaining a fragile consensus on the course of the transition with the army and political parties, Kean said.
Their signature achievement as regards reform has been to oversee drafting the July Charter. All the political parties agreed on the need for change, but not necessarily on which measures to take or in what order.
It was nonetheless important for the interim government to seek buy-in from all the parties contesting the vote, since making these reforms will be the responsibility of the incoming government. Yunus and his cabinet succeeded, but with caveats.
“After assuming office on August 8, 2024, Prof Yunus quickly outlined his agenda: initiate major political, economic and institutional change; prosecute those responsible for violence during the protests; and organise free and fair elections,” said Kean.
He said the government re-established the International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) – a domestic judicial body first formed in 2009 to investigate crimes committed during the 1971 war – to try those allegedly responsible for serious abuses under Hasina’s regime. It also formed six reform commissions focused on areas considered critical, such as the constitution, election system and judiciary. These steps culminated in a ceremony in October 2025, when most of the country’s political parties signed the July Charter (so named after the month when the uprising against Hasina began), an agreement on a set of reforms the next government is expected to make.
The interim government has not been without its critics, who argue that it has waged a vendetta against the Awami League, failed to restore security and been too accommodating toward far-right Islamist groups, among other things. But it has managed to shore up a cross-party political consensus (excluding the Awami League), helping it reach agreement on the July Charter. Its final task will be to make a smooth exit from Bangladesh’s political scene by ensuring credible, peaceful polls, then transferring power to a democratically elected administration.
Up to 127 million Bangladeshis will go to the polls on 12 February, in the first national elections since Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina’s government fell in August 2024. For tens of millions of them, it will be the first chance in their lives to participate in a credible vote.
The elections mark the final step in the delicate political transition that has been under way for a year and a half.
In the February election, the contest is expected to be closely fought between two blocs led by the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and Jamaat-e-Islami.
The BNP retains a strong organisational base but has been weakened by allegations of extortion, internal disputes over candidate selection, and a perception among many voters that it differs little from the Awami League. Party leaders have attempted to counter this image through disciplinary expulsions.
The BNP may benefit from recent events, including the December 2025 return of acting leader Tarique Rahman from long exile and the death of former prime minister Khaleda Zia, which drew huge public crowds. However, Tarique Rahman lacks his mother’s broad appeal and faces lingering corruption allegations, leaving the party’s electoral prospects uncertain.
He also mentioned that Jamaat-e-Islami, Bangladesh’s largest Islamist party, has gained momentum since the 2024 protest movement and appeals to voters as a disciplined alternative to elite-dominated politics, particularly among younger people.
It has also made significant gains in student politics. Jamaat has further strengthened its position through an electoral alliance with the National Citizen Party, though the deal has triggered internal dissent within the NCP.
With the political landscape transformed and the Awami League sidelined, predicting the outcome of the 12 February election is difficult. Polling suggests the BNP holds a narrow lead, while Jamaat appears set to surpass its best-ever electoral performance, Thomas Kean said.
Kean said the biggest risks revolve around security in the run-up to and during the polls. “Historically, political violence in Bangladesh has tended to increase around competitive elections. Bangladeshi human rights groups have already documented an uptick since August 2024. Recent months have witnessed clashes between BNP and Jamaat partisans, and more could flare up in hotly contested districts,” according to Kean.
Given the stakes, managing a dispute over the outcome of the vote would be Yunus’s biggest challenge yet, he added.
